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Social engineering attacks (SE-attacks) in enterprises are hastily growing and are 
becoming increasingly sophisticated. Generally, SE-attacks involve the psychological 
manipulation of employees into revealing confidential and valuable company data to 
cybercriminals. The ramifications could bring devastating financial and irreparable 
reputation loss to the companies. Because SE-attacks involve a human element, 
preventing these attacks can be tricky and challenging and has become a topic of interest 
for many researchers and security experts. While methods exist for detecting SE-attacks, 
our literature review of existing methods identified many crucial factors such as the 
national cultural, organizational, and personality traits of employees that enable SE-
attacks not considered by the other researchers. Thus, this thesis aims to address the gap 
by identifying and analyzing all the factors that make the SE-attack possible. We have 
developed a framework that operates in an enterprise environment and can detect the 
susceptibility of victims to SE-attacks. It relies on mapping Gragg’s psychological 
triggers of social engineering to three groups of factors, namely the national cultural 
factors, the organizational factors, and the personality traits of employees. Our analysis 
demonstrates that there is a correlation between the social engineering triggers and the 
three-layered factors that make employees susceptible to social engineering attacks. Thus, 
adding these factors in the proposed framework detects susceptibility of victims. Finally, 
we introduce a proposed framework that would detect and recognize weaknesses and 
susceptibility of employees in an organization which can be used for enhancing 













Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Theoretical Background 
Over the past years, social engineering attacks have proven to be one of the biggest 
concerns affecting the IT infrastructure, both in the private and public sectors. The 
damage it has imposed on corporates and the difficulty of avoiding such attacks have 
made social engineering the center point for many security experts and researchers. One 
issue that has been discussed immensely regarding social engineering is the human factor 
and its impact on the recurring success of these attacks. It has become widely known for 
many scholars that the human element is the weakest link in any IT system (Mitnick, 
Simon, & L., 2003) and (GBC-DELL Survey, 2015). How employees think and behave 
in the workplace is considered an important factor that can lead to more or less amounts 
of cyber threats (Ranjeev & Lawless, 2015). Therefore, it is crucial to study the factors 
and reasons influencing the behavior and values of employees to have a better 
understanding of how to deal with human-based attacks such as social engineering 
attacks. 
To understand the issue more clearly, we must first understand what we mean by social 
engineering attacks and how they are carried out. One definition states that social 
engineering is the use of psychological influence to manipulate a victim and gain his trust 
so he would be eventually revealing information (Allen, 2006, p.4). From that definition, 
we discover that the potential success of these attacks relies mainly on the vulnerability 
of the human factor. According to Ross (Ross, 2006), systems consist of three elements: 
hardware, software, and wetware. Wetware represents the human element in the system. 
Regardless of the amount of money and work put into enforcing the security of the IT 
infrastructure, a social engineer can patiently exploit the weaknesses of human nature and 
gain unauthorized access to sensitive information using his knowledge of psychological 
tricks and triggers (Allen, 2006, p.4). 
There are several factors on different levels that can influence the target and play a role in 
defining the possibility of the success of social engineering attacks. Some of the factors 
are related to the personality features of the victims and how they behave socially. Others 
are concerned with cultural factors designed by the society people live in. These factors 
play a role in social engineering attacks and can be used to measure the susceptibility of 
individuals based on them. 
Based on previous research, there has been some work done towards mapping the 
psychological triggers of SE attacks to human-based factors. One of the studies focused 
on mapping Cialdini’s principles of persuasion to the five personality traits of a victim 
(Uebelacker, S., & Quiel, S. 2014). However, there has not been a framework designed to 
take into consideration the impact of other factors that can be influenced by the 
environment of the victims. Even though researchers have indicated the existence of a 
relationship between the susceptibility of SE attacks and various factors (Parrish Jr, J. L., 
Bailey, J. L., & Courtney, J. F., 2009), we believe a framework that can map that 
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relationship is needed to be designed as it can provide a better understanding of the SE 
attacks and how can we come up with more successful countermeasures. Cultural factors 
are some of these influencers that can dictate humans’ mentality and behavior. These 
factors can be defined on a national scale or within the organization, which can be 
perceived as national and corporate culture. Their importance comes from their role in 
defining the environment of the employees that can be targeted, and analyzing such 
factors will give us a broader view of social engineering attacks enabling causes. 
Expanding the cultural vision from corporate to national can provide us with a better idea 
of how culture in general influences and affects security-related issues (Übelacker, S., 
2013). Moreover, as national cultures exist on a higher layer, they are excluded from an 
organization’s influence which makes them offer a cultural frame in which organizational 
cultures thrive (Übelacker, S., 2013). In addition, behaviors related to national cultures 
must be considered when we study and evaluate organizational cultures (Übelacker, S., 
2013). 
Based on our evaluation of existing research on the topic, we have developed a 
framework that is used to detect the susceptibility of social engineering attacks of 
victims. The framework focuses on the victims operating mainly in an organizational 
environment. It relies on mapping Gragg’s psychological triggers of social engineering to 
three groups of factors. These groups are the national cultural factors, the organizational 
factors, and the occupational personality traits. By covering these three groups of factors, 
we would have a layered and comprehensive approach that can enable us to analyze and 
detect the possible reasons that can lead to SE attacks in any given environment. Also, we 
also provided an additional framework that can use the result of the factors’ impact in 
measuring the susceptibility of workers in certain organization, and creating a tailored 
awareness program. We firmly believe that such a framework will manage to cover the 
main factors that can influence victims in any given organization. 
In the next sections, we will start by defining the concept of social engineering. Then, we 
are going to discuss the components of our suggested framework that measures the 
impact of the factors, and define their elements. We describe the psychological triggers of 
SE created by Gragg. Then, we will define the three groups of factors and what each 
factor represents. Finally, we are going to define our framework and discuss the mapped 
relationships between the factors and the triggers. Finally, we introduce a proposed 
framework that would detect and recognize weaknesses and susceptibility of employees 
in an organization, and would provide the ability to design a personalized training and 
education program to raise employee’s awareness against cybersecurity threats. 
1.2. Social Engineering Definitions 
1.2.1 In Social Science 
Within the context of social science, Social Engineering is defined as the discipline that 
focuses on manipulating and influencing people’s popular beliefs, attitudes, actions, and 
social behaviors at a wide level (Stergiou, D., 2013). In Wikipedia, social engineering is 
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defined as a top-down process used to influence specific behaviors and social attitudes on 
a high level for the purpose of producing sought characteristics in a target or a group of 
targets (Wikipedia, 2021). 
1.2.2 In Information Security 
Researchers have profoundly covered the definition of social engineering within the 
context of information security. According to (Mann, M. I., 2012), social engineering is 
the art of manipulating people using deception for the sake of obtaining information from 
them or persuade them to perform an action. Hadnagy (2010) elaborated furthermore to 
state that the solicited action may or may not in the deceived people’s interest. Although 
according to Hadnagy (2010), that may be true when social engineering is applied to a 
field like medicine, it is inconceivable to presume common interest from social 
engineering in information security. Another definition states that social engineering is 
psychological exploitation that scammers utilize to manipulate human vulnerabilities and 
launch emotional-based attacks on vulnerable people (Atkins, 2013). One popular 
definition defines it as the act of manipulating a person to achieve objectives that may or 
may not be in the target’s interests (Hadnagy et al., 2010). 
Additionally, we found out that most of the researchers that studied social engineering 
shared the same fundamental idea, which revolves around exploiting the vulnerability of 
the human user (Mann, M. I., 2012) (Hadnagy, 2010) (Pfleeger, C. P., & Pfleeger, S., 
2006) (Salahdine, F., & Kaabouch, N., 2019). 
1.3 Psychological Triggers of Social Engineering 
It is only logical to try to comprehend the psychology behind social engineering before 
developing a defense mechanism against it since it is both a social and psychological 
exercise (Gragg, (2003). In his work, (Gragg, 2003) has defined the psychological 
triggers which have the ability to influence or persuade people within the context of 
social engineering. He came up with seven triggers that are believed to be used by 
hackers and social engineers to manipulate their targets psychologically (Gragg, 2003). 




Figure 1  Psychological Triggers of Social Engineering 
1.3.1 Strong Affect 
Strong affect is a trigger that makes use of an intensified and heightened emotional state 
to allow a social engineer to obtain more than what would be reasonable (Gragg, 2003). 
To illustrate more, the victim is less likely to properly process presented arguments if he 
is experiencing a high sense of anger, surprise, or anticipation. Upon using this trigger, 
the hacker will trigger the targeted emotion to distract the victim and disturb their ability 
to think logically, evaluate, or create counterarguments (Scheeres, J. W., 2008). 
1.3.2 Overloading 
By implementing overloading, mistaken premises will be challenged as they are 
introduced hastily and are shoved between convincing arguments (Gragg, 2003). The 
victim’s logical functioning will be affected if he must deal with a lot of information 
quickly which could lead to a state of overload. People become mentally passive when 
facing big amounts of information to process; they tend to accept information instead of 
evaluating it (Burtner, p. 2). 
1.3.3 Reciprocation 
It is commonly known as a rule in our daily social interactions that we should always 
return the favor of other people. People would return the favor even it is more valuable 
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than the original act, or the original act was not requested in the first place (Rusch, J. J., 
1999). Reciprocation is regularly used in the corporate environment. Employees help 
each other out with the hope that the favor will be returned. It has become an unspoken 
system that is perceived crucial for the future success of the employees. Unfortunately, 
social engineers take advantage of this system (Gragg, 2003). 
1.3.4 Deceptive Relationships 
Deceptive relationships trigger is the concept of establishing a relationship with the aim 
of exploiting the other person (Gragg, 2003). It can be done in several ways, like sharing 
information or sharing a common enemy. There are many ways to exploit the relationship 
once it has been developed (Vigilante). 
1.3.5 Diffusion of Responsibility and Moral Duty 
This is a method where the hacker tricks the target into believing that they will be spared 
from responsibilities towards their actions, or their actions will hold a positive outcome 
(Scheeres, J. W., 2008). The targets are made to believe that their decisions will be the 
difference between the success or failure of the discussed situation (Gragg, 2003). 
1.3.6 Authority 
We normally respond to authority as it is in our human nature. Convincing the target that 
he is dealing with some authority figure can bring a great benefit for the social engineer. 
The fact that it is even more difficult to verify the authority of the perpetrator makes this 
a trigger a very powerful one (Gragg, 2003). In real life, we see this trigger being used 
widely by hackers. 
1.3.7 Integrity/Consistency 
In this trigger, the hackers will make use of people’s inclination towards following 
commitments for the purpose of persuading them to execute some action (Gragg, 2003) 
(Scheeres, J. W. (2008)). From another aspect, “people have a tendency to believe that 
others are expressing their true attitudes when they make a statement” (Gragg, 2003). The 
tendency to believe others is based mainly on their own honesty in expressing emotions 
(Rusch, 1999). 
1.4 National Cultures 
In his 5-D model, Hofstede (1980) explained the five cultural dimensions per country. He 
defined them to include: power distance, individualism, masculinity, uncertainty 
avoidance, and long-term orientation (Hofstede Center.). It is considered that various 
nations react differently to anthropological issues. Those issues can include analyzing 
how to work out unfairness, behavior with regard to the relationship of individual in a 
community, how to handle uncertainty, and the assumptions of gender (Anon, 2015). 
According to available research, there is a need for more evaluation on the impact of 
these dimensions on security-related issues. Table 1 describes those five dimensions. 
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Table 1 Hofstede 5-D Model of National Culture. From (Hofstede Center) & (Übelacker, S., 2013). 
Dimension Description 
Power Distance (PDI) 
The expectation and acceptance of 
unequally distributed power among 
members of institutions and organizations 
in a country. 
Individualism vs. Collectivism (IDV) Reflects “the degree of interdependence a society maintains among its members.” 
Masculinity vs. Femininity (MAS) 
Describes the motivation of people what 
they think is important to achieve. 
Wanting to be the best is “masculine”; 
liking what you do defined as “feminine”. 
Uncertainty Avoidance (UAI) 
Specifies whether members of a culture 
experience “ambiguous or unknown 
situations” as a threat that needs to be 
avoided. 
Long-Term vs. Short-Term Orientation 
(LTO) 
Pictures the degree a society has towards a 
future-oriented or short-term perspective. 
 
1.5 Organizational Cultures 
According to (Hofstede Center.), “organizational culture is the way in which members of 
an organization relate to each other, their work and the outside world in comparison to 
other organizations”. Organizational culture involves working people in an organization 
inducing on them a form of organizational behavior (Deal and Kennedy, 1982), (Scholz, 
1987), (Watkins, 2013), and (A. Leroch, 2014). There have been many studies conducted 
on the topic of organizational culture. One of the studies is the Multi-Focus Model on 
Organizational Culture developed by Hofstede (Hofstede Center.). It concluded that there 
are six dimensions of organizational culture that can be used to measure the cultural level 
of a certain organization (Hofstede Center.). As shown in Table 2, These dimensions 
include organizational effectiveness, customer orientation, level of control, focus, 
approachability, and management philosophy. 
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Table 2 Hofstede Multi-Focus Model on Organizational Culture. From (Hofstede Center.) 
Dimension Description 
Organizational effectiveness 
Means-Oriented VS. Goal-Oriented 
• This dimension is closely 
connected to the effectiveness of 
the organization. 
• In a means-oriented culture, the 
key feature is the way in which 
work must be carried out, the 
“how”. 
• In a goal-oriented culture, 
employees are primarily out to 
achieve specific internal goals or 
results, the “what”. 
Customer orientation 
Internally Driven VS. Externally Driven 
• In a highly internally driven 
culture, employees perceive their 
task towards the outside world as 
a given, based on the idea that 
business ethics and honesty 
matter most. 
• In a very externally driven 
culture, the only emphasis is on 
meeting the customer’s 
requirements; results are most 
important. 
Level of control 
Easygoing Work Discipline VS. Strict 
Work Discipline 
• This dimension refers to the 
amount of internal structuring, 
control, and discipline. 
• A very easygoing culture reveals 
an internal fluid structure, a lack 
of predictability, and little control 
and discipline. 
• A very strict work discipline 
reveals the reverse. 
Focus 
Local VS. Professional 
• In a local company, employees 
identify with the boss and/or the 
unit in which one works. 
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• In a professional organization, the 
identity of an employee is 
determined by his profession 
and/or the content of the job. 
Approachability 
Open System VS. Closed System 
• This dimension relates to the 
accessibility of an organization. 
• In a very open culture, 
newcomers are made immediately 
welcome. 
• In a very closed organization, it is 
the reverse. 
Management philosophy 
Employee-Oriented VS. Work-Oriented 
• In very employee-oriented 
organizations, members of staff 
feel that personal problems are 
considered. 
• In very work-oriented 
organizations, there is heavy 
pressure to perform the task even 
if this is at the expense of 
employees. 
 
1.6 Occupational Personality Traits 
In previous studies, researchers have been studying the personality traits of employees 
within the work environment. Occupational grouping of personalities of workers can help 
to assess the organizational subcultures of the organization (Übelacker, 2013). Hossiep 
and Paschen (2012) developed their version of an employee’s personality traits which is 
based on the employee’s type of occupation. They named it “Bochumer Inventar zur 
berufsbezogenen Persönlichkeits-beschreibung (BIP)”; it means a German personality 
inventory for organizational applications. The traits are comprised of occupational 






Table 3 A German personality Inventory for Organizational Applications (Hossiep and Paschen, 2012). 
Trait Description 
Occupational orientation 
• It refers to the employee’s 
motivation to work with a high 
standard of quality as well as the 
tendency to design processes and 
structures to use, and his 
motivation for social influence. 
Work behavior 
• It refers to the employee’s level of 
conscientiousness, flexibility, and 
willingness to turn decisions into 
implementable activities. 
Interpersonal skills (social skills) 
• These skills include sensitivity, 
contacting ability, sociability, 
teamwork orientation, and 
assertiveness. 
Mental constitution 
• It defines an employee’s emotional 
stability, resilience, and 
confidence. 
 
After providing a theoretical background of the topic, we are going to present the thesis 
as follows: chapter 2 is going to discuss the suggested framework and the impact of its 
layers on the susceptibility of SE attacks as well as providing a statistical approach to 
find the significance. In chapter 3, the thesis will explain how to apply the framework 
practically. In chapter 4, we are going to provide our conclusion and the direction of 
future work. 
Chapter 2: The Three-Layered Framework 
2.1 Research Methodology 
In this thesis, we adopted a theoretical approach to evaluate the correlation between the 
three-layered factors we used and the SE psychological triggers. We hope to validate the 
framework in the future by conducting empirical research to test our findings. 
The examined studies show some shortcomings that an organization may encounter when 
implementing policies, countermeasures, and mechanisms for preventing social 
engineering attacks. For a start, a limitation in executing countermeasures originates from 
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the education, capability, skills, and personality traits of employees (Flores, & Ekstedt, 
2013), (Peltier, 2006), and (Algarni et al., 2013). 
The distinctions between workers create a significant challenge in the implementation 
process of defensive measures. Moreover, the difference in training and level of 
awareness amongst workers restricts the progress of these countermeasures as well (Fan, 
Lwakatare, & Rong, 2017), and (Mataracioglu, & Ozkan, 2011). 
The methods used by attackers to obtain corporate sensitive information are always 
evolving. Protecting important information is reliant on the capability to influence and 
convince workers to adjust their behaviors and practices that lead to the disclosure of 
private information that can be used by attackers (Smith, Papadaki, & Furnell, 2013), and 
(Greavu-Serban, & Serban, 2014). Based on that, there is a need to address the role and 
impact of factors influencing the behavior of employees within an organization. We think 
that our framework will provide a mechanism to study such a phenomenon in the context 
of cultural influence. 
We mainly focused on the impact of national cultural factors, organizational factors, and 
employees’ personality traits on the susceptibility to SE attacks. It is based on our firm 
belief that the characteristics of the environment surrounding the targets in organizations 
can help increase or decrease their susceptibility to SE attacks. Therefore, we sought out 
the answers to the following questions: 
• What are the reasons leading to a successful SE attack? 
• Does the susceptibility to SE attacks differ based on the national culture of 
targets? 
• Does the susceptibility to SE attacks differ based on the organizational culture of 
targets? 
• Does the susceptibility to SE attacks differ according to employee’s personality 
traits? 
• How can we utilize the findings in an organizational context? 
To answer our research questions, we conducted a comprehensive literature review on 
SE-related literature as well as studies revolving around cultural influence. We aimed to 
define a correlation between the studied factors and the SE triggers and map these factors 
in regard to their influence on their correlated elements. We used a layered approach with 
our evaluation of the factors of the framework. Such an approach focuses on the effect of 
each layer on the next one. As a result, we managed to establish a framework that maps 
the susceptibility to SE attacks with cultural factors by proxy. Moreover, we proposed a 
practical framework aimed at measuring the susceptibility in each organization to 
develop better educational and training programs. 
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2.2 Suggested Framework to Measure the Influence of the Three-Layered Factors 
Our research on existing literature indicates that there is hierarchical influence among 
three layers of factors. The features of a national culture can have its impact on shaping 
the cultural values of an organization within. Also, the set of values of a certain 
organization is reflected upon the behavior of its employees. Therefore, the susceptibility 
of employees to social engineering attacks may be higher or lower based on the 
environment of these employees, nationally and within the organization.  
Because of that, we claim that it is very useful to evaluate the relationships of these 
factors with the social engineering psychological triggers to develop a more 
comprehensive understanding of such attacks and how to better handle them. 
Regardless of the fact that a direct correlation of cultures and security awareness might 
appear to be difficult, we should not disregard their influence on human behavior within 
the context of security awareness (Übelacker, S., 2013). Therefore, we will utilize our 
conclusions, and apply them to a framework designed for the purpose of providing a 
mechanism to improve the susceptibility of employees in an organization. 
2.2.1 The Impact of National Culture on The Organizational Culture 
Even though it is possible to measure the correlation between the national culture factors 
and the SE triggers, it is more convenient for us to avoid cultural bias to first analyze 
their impact on the organizational culture, which shapes the behavior of the establishment 
employees or potential targets. National cultures provide a frame in which organizational 
cultures function (Übelacker, S., 2013). Values and norms defining national cultures must 
be considered when we evaluate organizational culture factors. To do that in our research, 
we are going to discuss the impact of each national cultural factor on the factors 
comprising the organizational culture by mapping each influential factor to its influenced 
organizational factor. 
Based on existing research, it has been widely noted that there exists a relationship 
between national and organizational cultures (Schneider, B., & Smith, D. B., Eds., 2004). 
Westwood (1992) states in his work the consequences of the national cultural dimensions 
scores on the organizational level. His findings explained the relationship of each 
dimension on the organizational norms and behaviors. Additionally, there are significant 
influences of culture on the work values which have been proved by the paper of Claes 
and Ruiz-Quintanilla (1998) when we take into consideration the dimensions introduced 
by Hofstede (1991). 
A. Power Distance 
Upon analyzing the Power Distance dimension (PDI), we discovered that it substantially 
affects three organizational dimensions namely level of control, dimension of focus and 
the management philosophy dimension. PDI can influence the organizational culture with 
regard to the dimension of the level of control. High power distance encourages a strict 
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work discipline, while low scores would be catering for the creation of easy-going 
discipline. The subordinate and supervisor in large power distance countries have large 
emotional distance between them which disheartens the subordinate of getting guidance 
by the supervisor. On the ither hand, the working relationships in small power distance 
countries are more confirmed and there are communication, skill-development behaviors, 
and networking (Masouras, & Papademetriou, 2014). 
PDI also can relate to the dimension of focus as high scores promote local-based focus, 
and low scores would lead to professional-based. In high power distance countries, 
organizational structures are very centralized with clear levels of managers and 
subordinates and tall hierarchies (Hofstede, 2001). 
The management philosophy dimension is affected as well by PDI, where high scores 
influence a work-oriented philosophy, and low scores would promote the reverse. 
According to Hofstede (2001), countries with high PDI influence organizations where 
managers depend on formal rules and guidance to manage using an authoritative 
managerial style and decision making. 
Table 4 Power Distance Impact on Organizational Culture 
Organizational 
Culture Dimensions High Power Distance Low Power Distance 
Level of Control 
Strict Work Discipline 
• The subordinate and 
supervisor have big emotional 
distance between them. 
• The subordinates are 
discouraged of getting advice 
by the supervisor. 
Easy-Going Discipline 
• The working relationships are 
more promoted. 





• Organizational structures are 
very centralized. 
• Tall hierarchies and clear 
levels of managers and 
subordinates. 
Professional-Based Focus 
• Flat organizational 
hierarchies. 




• Managers rely on formal 
rules to manage. 
• Authoritative managerial 
style and decision making. 
Employee-Oriented Philosophy 
• Managers rely on personal 
experience. 
• More consultative or 





B. Uncertainty Avoidance 
It was noted that national cultures with high uncertainty avoidance (UAI) have a positive 
impact on the organizational effectiveness dimension. A low value of uncertainty 
avoidance is more likely to lead to mean-oriented organizational cultures. On the other 
hand, a high score of uncertainty avoidance would contribute towards more goal-oriented 
workplaces. Countries with weak uncertainty avoidance are open to new ideas, rewarding 
systems, and innovative behavior at the workplace. On the contrary, strong uncertainty 
avoidance nations are resistant to new ideas and innovation, and support workers’ 
motivation using security (Masouras, & Papademetriou, 2014). 
Additionally, UAI also contributes to the dimension of level of control. High UAI will 
influence a stricter work culture while low scores would influence the reverse. As stated 
by Hofstede (1986), nations with low uncertainty-avoidance are open minded and often 
try to minimize uncertainty. Therefore, they welcome new things and lifelong learning 
leading to an easy-going work environment. 
Table 5 Uncertainty Avoidance Impact on Organizational Culture 
Organizational Culture 




• Resistance to new ideas and 
innovation and support employee’s 
motivation by security. 
Means-Oriented 
> Openness to new ideas, innovative 
behavior, rewarding systems at the 
workplace. 
Level of Control 
Strict Work Discipline 
• Superiors are pessimistic about 
subordinate ambition. 
• Innovators feel constrained by 
rules. 
• Resistance to new things and 
lifelong learning. 
Easy-Going Discipline 
• Acceptance of new things and 
lifelong learning which leads to an 
easy-going work environment. 
 
C. Individualism vs. Collectivism 
For the dimension of Individualism vs. Collectivism (IDV), its score would influence the 
dimension of customer orientation. A high IDV collective score is likely to create an 
internally driven environment, and high IDV individualistic scores influence an 
externally driven culture. Collective cultures would lead to a work culture in which 
workers act in the interest of the in-group, and their loyalty to the company is relatively 
low. Also, employee-employer relations are almost like a family bond. In individualistic 
nations, workers act in their interests, and their loyalty to the organizations is high. 
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Additionally, the employee-employer relationship is based on the market (Hofstede, 
2001). 
In addition to that, IDV would have the same influence on the dimension of level of 
control as collective cultures are easy-going in their work discipline and the opposite is 
leaning towards strict ethics. Howard et al., (1983) concluded that Japanese managers 
acquire social values in comparison to American managers who are individualists. 
Also, IDV can be correlated to the dimension of focus. Collective cultures aspire for 
more local-focused organizational cultures, and individualistic ones push toward 
professional focus. Youn (2000) proved in his study that individualist nations like the 
United States have more powerful learning beliefs than collectivist nations like South 
Korea for the reason that individualism encourages the challenge to work. 
IDV is also mapped to the dimension of approachability. Collectivism in a certain culture 
carries its effect to more open systems while individualism creates the inclination to 
closed systems. Hofstede (1991) states that in the workplace, the workers from 
individualistic countries are more independent, worry about them and plan future career. 
On the contrary, workers from collective nations are more open to training, sharing their 
skills, having good relationships and support common tasks. 
Finally, IDV with high collective scores leads to establishing a work-oriented philosophy. 
High IDV individualistic scores indicate more focus on employee-oriented management 
philosophy. Hui and Yee (1999) proved in their study in Hong Kong that there are 
variations in job satisfaction and teambuilding amongst collectivist and individualist 
employees. Collectivists promote teambuilding while individualistic workers promote 
more job satisfaction. Kanungo and Wright (1983) showed that British managers assign 
more importance to independence and individual accomplishment than French managers. 
On the opposite, French managers give value to organization policies, security, expert 
management, and comfortable conditions in work. 
Table 6 IvC Impact on Organizational Culture 
Organizational Culture 
Dimensions Individualism Collectivism 
Customer Orientation 
Externally Driven 
• Employees act in their own 
interests. 
• Commitment to the organizations 
is high. 
• Employee-Employer relationship is 
based on the market. 
Internally Driven 
• Employees act in the interest of in-
group 
• Commitment to the company is 
relatively low. 
• Employee-Employer relationships 
are almost like a family link 
Level of Control Strict Work Discipline Easy-Going Discipline 
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• Managers are individualists in their 
relationships with employees. 
• Tasks and company prevail over 
personal relationships. 
• Managers develop social values. 
• Better to reward based on equality 
(give everyone the same reward). 
• Support of teamwork. 
Focus 
Professional-Based Focus 
• Stronger learning beliefs. 
• Promotes the challenge to work. 
Local-Based Focus 
• Employee-Employer relationships 
is almost like a family link. 
• Belief in collective decisions. 




• The workers are more independent. 
• Workers worry only about them 
and plan future career. 
Open Systems 
• Workers are open to training. 
• Open to share their skills. 
• Workers have good relationships 




• Individualistic culture promotes 
job satisfaction. 
Work-Oriented Philosophy 
• Give importance to company 
policies, security, expert 
management. 
 
D. Masculinity vs. Femininity 
In the masculinity vs. femininity (MAS) dimension, a feminine culture encourages an 
easy-going level of control while masculinity promotes a level of control that is strict 
relatively. Hofstede (2001) states that the employee’s relationship with work in masculine 
cultures is based on living to work and seeking high pay. Moreover, workers look for 
security, high pay, and interesting work. While in feminine cultures, employees work in 
order to live, and they prefer to work for fewer hours. Also, workers look for better 
working conditions and relationships in work. 
Moreover, MAS is an influencing factor on the dimension of approachability. High 
scores in femininity are very supportive of open systems in the corporate environment. 
However, based on analyzing the influence masculinity, it is likely that its effect on 
approachability may not be of relevance. According to Claes and Ruiz-Quintanilla 
(1998), masculinity deals with a challenging job, recognition, a chance for advancement 
to higher-level jobs, competition between colleagues and performance, wages, and career 
planning. Femininity cultures promote collaboration in work, security, and good working 
connections. Moreover, feminine cultures promote consultation, skill improvement, and 
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networking. These are practices that are promoted by small power distance nations as 
well. 
As for the dimension of management philosophy, a feminine national culture can help 
shift the orientation of the management philosophy on the employees’ side while 
masculinity can be inclined towards a job-oriented environment. Hofstede (2001) 
mentions that feminine cultures influence managers to be employees like others, and 
work problems are resolved by compromise and negotiations. 
Table 7 MvF Impact on Organizational Culture 
Organizational Culture 
Dimensions Masculinity Femininity 
Approachability 
Closed Systems 
• Challenging work, recognition, and 
opportunity for development to 
higher level jobs. 
• Competition among colleagues in 
performance and earnings. 
• Facilitates career planning. 
Open Systems 
• Cooperation in work. 
• Security and good working 
relationships. 
• Consultation, skill development 
and networking. 
Level of Control 
Strict Work Discipline 
• Employee’s relationship with work 
is based on living in order to work. 
• Seeking a high pay. 
• Workers look for security. 
Easy-Going Discipline 
• Employees work in order to live. 
• They prefer to work for less hours. 
• Workers look for better working 





• The company projects are 
prioritized over employees. 
• Conflicts are resolved through 
fighting until the best “man” wins. 
 
Employee-Oriented Philosophy 
• Managers are influenced to be 
employees like others. 
• Work problems are resolved 
through compromise and 
negotiations. 
 
E. Long-Term vs. Short-Term Orientation 
To the best of our knowledge, the influence of the long-term vs short-term dimension on 
the organizational culture is not considered by other researchers. Intuitively, this 
dimension influences organizational cultures as nations develop commitments either on 
long-term or short-term. Have consistency, if use hyphen between long-term and short-
18 
 
term have that everywhere. Long-term orientation focuses on the future by postponing 
short-term material or short-term emotional satisfaction. On the contrary, short-term 
orientation is when you are centered around the present or past and consider them more 
important than the future. 
 
2.2.2 The Impact of Organizational Culture on Employee’s Personality Traits 
Factors such as organizational culture influence the shaping of the information security 
culture. Empirical studies have confirmed the impact of organizational culture on the 
culture of information security. On itself, information security culture is acknowledged as 
part of the corporate culture (Ruighaver, Maynard, & Chang, 2007), (Dojkovski, 
Lichtenstein, & Warren, 2006), (Schlienger & Teufel, 2005). Therefore, studying the 
impact of these factors can help to improve the overall security awareness of the 
organization. According to (Jedge and Cable, 1997), organizational cultures are linked to 
personality traits that respond to the attributes of organizational culture’s factors. without 
doubt the organizational culture is linked to personality trait. Based on general 
understanding, we claim that organizational cultural dimensions influence personality 
traits. We intend to show the verification of our claim and calculation of that relationship 
score through empirical studies in the future. 
A. Organizational effectiveness 
This dimension is closely connected to the effectiveness of the organization. In a means-
oriented culture, the key feature is the way in which work has to be carried out–the 
“how”. In a goal-oriented culture, employees are primarily out to achieve specific internal 
goals or results–the “what”. 
This dimension opposes a concern with the means of doing the job to a concern with the 
goals set by organizations. In the means-oriented cultures, people regard themselves as 
dodging risks and giving only a little effort in their jobs, while living each day with the 
Figure 2 The Influence of National Culture on Organizational Culture 
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same routine. In goals-oriented cultures, people recognize themselves as comfortable in 
unfamiliar conditions and put in a maximal work effort, while each day is considered to 
bring different challenges. It is challenging not to attach a “good” label to the goals-
oriented side and a “bad” label to the other side for this dimension. However, 
organizations differ with their priorities based on the nature of their business. 
B. Customer orientation 
In a highly internally driven culture, employees perceive their task towards the outside 
world as a given, based on the idea that business ethics and honesty matter most. In a 
very externally driven culture, the only emphasis is on meeting the customer’s 
requirements; results are most important. 
This dimension deals with the popular assumption of customer orientation. Pragmatic 
units were market-driven, while normative units perceived their task in relation to the 
outside world. We can see that in the normative units, the major stress was on accurately 
following organizational plans, which were more important than results. In the pragmatic 
units, there was a major stress on satisfying the customer’s requirements; outcomes were 
more valuable than exact procedures. 
C. Level of control 
This dimension refers to the amount of internal structuring, control, and discipline. A 
very easygoing culture reveals an internal fluid structure, a lack of predictability, and 
little control and discipline. A very strict work discipline reveals the reverse. 
It relates to the volume of internal structuring in the organization. People in loose control 
units believed that no one thought of cost, the meeting time was only set approximately, 
and jokes about the business and the job were common. People in tight control units 
expressed their work environment as cost-conscious, meeting times were kept punctually, 
and jokes about the company and/or the job were limited. 
D. Focus 
In a local company, employees identify with the boss and/or the unit in which one works. 
In a professional organization, the identity of an employee is determined by his 
profession and/or the content of the job. 
This dimension crosses units whose employees obtain their identity mainly from the 
organization to units in which people classify with their type of job. Members of 
parochial cultures considered that the organization’s norms related to their behavior at 
home as well as on the job. They felt that in hiring employees, the company looked at 
their social and family background as much as their job competence. On the other hand, 
members of professional cultures viewed their private lives as their own affairs. They 





This dimension relates to the accessibility of an organization. In a very open culture, 
newcomers are made immediately welcome. In a very closed organization, it is the 
reverse. 
Moreover, approachability opposes open systems to closed systems. In the open system 
units, members viewed both the company and its people as open to newcomers and 
outsiders. Nearly anyone would click into the organization, and new workers required 
only a few days to feel at home. In the closed system units, the organization and its 
workers were thought to be closed and reserved, even amongst insiders. Only very 
particular people fit into the organization, and new employees demanded more than a 
year to feel at home. 
F. Management philosophy 
In very employee-oriented organizations, members of staff feel that personal problems 
are considered. In very work-oriented organizations, there is heavy pressure to perform 
the task even if this is at the expense of employees. 
This dimension crosses a concern for employees to a concern for completing the job. In 
employee-oriented cultures, workers felt that their individual difficulties were taken into 
account and that the organization took accountability for employees' welfare. Also, major 
decisions were initiated by groups or committees. In the job-oriented units, people 
encountered intense pressure to complete the task. They regarded the organization as 
involved only in the work workers did and not in their personal and family welfare. They 
perceive that important decisions were made by individuals. 
  
 
Figure 3 The Impact of Organizational Culture on Employee’s Personality Traits 
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2.2.3 The Impact of Employee’s Personality Traits on the Susceptibility to SE 
Attacks 
A. Occupational Orientation 
As occupational orientation defines the employees’ ability to work at high standards and 
adhere to rules, they are vulnerable to methods that make use of social norms, policies, 
and rules. Continuance commitment, which is linked to occupational orientation, 
increases the vulnerability to SE. For example, even though people are concerned 
regarding their personal information, they would actively trade-off privacy for 
convenience as a result of a cost-benefit correlation to the benefits of perceived rewards 
(Uebelacker, & Quiel, 2014) & (Workman, 2008). Therefore, we suggest that it is 
correlated with the triggers: reciprocity, authority, and Integrity/consistency. It has also 
been declared that security training can reduce SE susceptibility, particularly for 
conscientious people (Parrish Jr et al., 2009). 
B. Work Behavior 
The level of flexibility in the employee’s work behavior and his openness to new 
experiences would likely lead to an increased level of susceptibility to SE attacks. People 
with high openness values are less concerned about privacy issues connected to location-
based services. These people’s inclination to explore new experiences affects their risk 
evaluation (Junglas, & Spitzmuller, 2006). This can be conveyed to SE that free-minded 
people underrate the risk of becoming a victim and consequently do not exhibit sufficient 
coping strategies (Uebelacker, & Quiel, 2014). However, openness could lead employees 
to more technological proficiency which make them less vulnerable to SE attacks. As a 
result, we think that work behavior is only related to the trigger of strong affect for the 
reason of open people inclination to the belief of freedom of constraints. 
C. Interpersonal Skills (Social Skills) 
Employees with a high sense of trust tend to worry less about issues like privacy 
infringement. Extraversion is a defining factor in the interpersonal skills of employees. 
Extraverted people are considered a higher security risk (Darwish et al., 2012). 
Additionally, extraverted workers are more likely to infringe cyber-security policies, 
therefore, deciding to oppose policies to comply with suspicious and malicious requests 
(McBride et al., 2012). Weirich and Sasse (2001) show that employees who did not 
disclose their passwords, hence displaying a low level of SE susceptibility, are perceived 
as unsocial and distant by their co-workers, indicating low extraversion values. We can 
infer that the susceptibility of trusting people would be high since they would be willing 
to share private information with others based on established trust. Moreover, we predict 
their influence by the triggers: authority, reciprocity, and deceptive relationships. 
D. Mental Constitution 
One of the describing attributes to mental constitution is the level of agreeableness of 
employees, and their trust and confidence. “Agreeableness is possibly the personality trait 
that is most associated with phishing”, and to a greater extent, social engineering (Parrish 
Jr et al., 2009). More agreeable people are at a higher chance of a security risk (Darwish 
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et al., 2012). Trust, a sub-trait of agreeableness, is assumed to mainly establish the 
relationship between agreeableness and SE susceptibility. An assumption that was shown 
in studies by (Weirich and Sasse, 2001) and by (Workman, 2008). Moreover, if the 
employee achieves low levels of the mental constitution, he would be more likely to be 
exploited as his confidence would fall. Nevertheless, more neurotic people are less likely 
to violate cyber-security systems (McBride et al., 2012). People low on self-images and 
with acknowledged paranoia are more likely not to reveal private information showing a 
low level of SE susceptibility (Weirich and Sasse, 2001). We expect hackers to engage 
the triggers of overloading, strong affect, diffusion of responsibility and moral duty, and 
integrity and consistency. 
Table 8 The Impact of Employee's Personality Traits 





• Workers are vulnerable 
to methods that make use 
of social norms, policies, 
and rules. 
• People would actively 
trade-off privacy for 
convenience as a result of 
a cost-benefit correlation 
to the benefits of 
perceived rewards. 
Work Behavior • Strong Affect 
• Free-minded people 
underrate the risk of 
becoming a victim. 
• do not exhibit sufficient 
coping strategies. 
• Open people are inclined 
to the belief of freedom 
of constraints. 




• Deceptive Relationships 
• Extraverted workers are 
more likely to oppose 
policies to comply with 
malicious requests. 
• Unsocial and distant 
workers display a low 
level of SE susceptibility. 
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• The susceptibility of 




• Strong Affect 
• Diffusion of Responsibility 
and Moral Duty 
• Integrity and Consistency 
• More agreeable people 
are at a higher chance of 
a security risk. 
• Employees with low 
levels of mental 
constitution, are more 
likely to be exploited as 




2.3 Statistical Analysis of National Culture Influence 
To validate the proposed framework, there is a need for an appropriate method of 
quantitative examinations of our framework's assumptions and hypothesis. The 
correlation of the studied factors and the susceptibility to SE attacks can be further 
confirmed using empirical data measured within the context of the factors of our 
suggested framework. Based on our research, there is a scarcity of available studies 
assessing the impact of cultural significance in SE attacks. Moreover, measured data 
extracted from empirical studies that can be used to set metrics for the factors influencing 
SE susceptibility are not available in abundance, with the exception of national cultural 
dimensions. Therefore, we will be conducting a statistical analysis only on the correlation 
of Hofstede's national cultural dimensions to SE susceptibility as it has been evaluated 
thoroughly in previous research. In addition, the analysis provided will provide a clear 
Figure 4 The Impact of Employee’s Personality Traits on The Susceptibility to SE Attacks 
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vision of how practitioners can collect usable data on the rest of the framework, as well 
as having an implementable approach to measure the influence of culture within the 
context of SE. 
Our analysis relied on the study made by (Sample et al., 2017), where they studied the 
victims of social engineering attacks as a group within the context of Hofstede's cultural 
framework to conclude whether particular cultural dimensions correlate with the victims 
of social engineering attacks. We relied on the data implemented in the study to test the 
groups as the paper extracted the data related to countries exploited by social engineering 
attacks between 2011 to 2014. The resources used to collect the data were: the Zone-H 
archive, Hofstede's cultural data values, and the World Internet Stats archive. The data 
were filtered to include SE attacks of countries measured by Hofstede's framework. 
The Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon (MWW) is a non-parametric statistical test used to 
compare two collections from the same population to evaluate the similarity of these two 
groups. In our case, we used this test to compare the victims and non-victims’ countries. 
Our objective was to assess whether the victim and non-victim groups are culturally 
different from a statistical perspective. The probability value (p-value) that emanates 
from this analysis would be utilized for inferential purposes. We can conclude the 
statistical significance of the p-value if it is equal to 0.05 or less when executing this test. 
H0: From a cultural perspective, there are no statistical differences between victims 
and non-victims in a given year. 
Testing the hypothesis H0 was performed assuming the null hypothesis. The four-year 
window was investigated to decide whether longer-term patterns might exist. Therefore, 
yearly MWW tests and the Spearman correlation tests were done. The null hypothesis 
asserted that each group was statistically the same, suggesting that their distributions 
were identical. It can be described mathematically as H0: H1 F(t) = G(t). One or more 
dimensions being statistically different with probability values of ≤0.05 is required for 
the rejection of the null hypothesis (H0). 
 
Equation 1 Statistical Difference Between Two Groups 
𝐺𝐺(𝑡𝑡) = 𝐹𝐹(𝑡𝑡 − ∆)    𝑤𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒,𝐺𝐺 & 𝐹𝐹:𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 𝐹𝐹𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷, 𝑡𝑡: 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝐷𝐷,∆: 𝑑𝑑𝐷𝐷𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝐷𝐷𝐹𝐹𝑒𝑒 
 
Calculating the MWW relies on ordering the values from smallest to largest and 
calculating the sum of the values afterward. S1 is the rank of the Y1, and Sn is the rank of 




Equation 2 Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test Formula 
𝑊𝑊 =  �𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗
𝑛𝑛
𝑗𝑗=1
   𝑤𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒,𝑊𝑊: 𝑇𝑇𝑒𝑒𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡𝐷𝐷𝐹𝐹,𝐷𝐷: 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒 𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒, 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆: 𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅 𝑆𝑆 
 Results 
The data was collected and filtered based on the countries evaluated by Hofstede’s 
model, and the type of attack where social engineering attacks were chosen. Out of the 
available dataset, we set the countries’ lists based on records from the year 2014. The 
countries were divided into two groups: victims, non-victims, where victims refer to 
countries that are victims of social engineering attacks, and non-victims are the ones that 
did not receive social engineering attacks. The reason is to apply the MWW test and find 
the significance value of Hofstede’s cultural dimensions. 
The number of records collected before filtering by attack was 286103 records. After 
filtering by social engineering attacks, the records were 3932. The following table lists 
the number of countries and records collected from 2014. 
















2014 25 62 282171 3932 
 
Table 10 Victim Countries National Culture Values (retrieved from Hofstede Center.) 
No. Country PDI IvC MvF UAI LvS IvR 
1 ALBANIA 90 20 80 70 61 15 
2 ARGENTINA 49 46 56 86 20 62 
3 AUSTRALIA 36 90 61 51 21 71 
4 BANGLADESH 80 20 55 60 47 20 
5 BELGIUM 65 75 54 94 82 57 
6 BHUTAN 94 52 32 28 NA NA 
7 BRAZIL 69 38 49 76 44 59 
8 BULGARIA 70 30 40 85 69 16 
9 CANADA 39 80 52 48 36 68 
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10 CHILE 63 23 28 86 31 68 
11 CHINA 80 20 66 30 87 24 
12 COLOMBIA 67 13 64 80 13 83 
13 CROATIA 73 33 40 80 58 33 
14 CZECH.REPUBLIC 57 58 57 74 70 29 
15 DENMARK 18 74 16 23 35 70 
16 DOMINICAN.REPUBLIC 65 30 65 45 13 54 
17 EGYPT 70 25 45 80 7 4 
18 ESTONIA 40 60 30 60 82 16 
19 FINLAND 33 63 26 59 38 57 
20 FRANCE 68 71 43 86 63 48 
21 GERMANY 35 67 66 65 83 40 
22 GREECE 60 35 57 100 45 50 
23 HUNGARY 46 80 88 82 58 31 
24 ICELAND 30 60 10 50 28 67 
25 INDIA 77 48 56 40 51 26 
26 INDONESIA 78 14 46 48 62 38 
27 IRAN 58 41 43 59 14 40 
28 IRELAND 28 70 68 35 24 65 
29 ISRAEL 13 54 47 81 38 NA 
30 ITALY 50 76 70 75 61 30 
31 JAPAN 54 45 95 92 88 42 
32 KENYA 70 25 60 50 NA NA 
33 LATVIA 44 70 9 63 69 13 
34 LITHUANIA 42 60 19 65 82 16 
35 MALAYSIA 100 26 50 36 41 57 
36 MEXICO 81 30 69 82 24 97 
37 MOROCCO 70 46 53 68 14 25 
38 NEPAL 65 30 40 40 NA NA 
39 NETHERLANDS 38 80 14 53 67 68 
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40 NEW.ZEALAND 22 79 58 49 33 75 
41 NIGERIA 80 30 60 55 13 84 
42 NORWAY 31 69 8 50 35 55 
43 PHILIPPINES 94 32 64 44 27 42 
44 POLAND 68 60 64 93 38 29 
45 PORTUGAL 63 27 31 99 28 33 
46 ROMANIA 90 30 42 90 52 20 
47 RUSSIA 93 39 36 95 81 20 
48 SAUDI.ARABIA 95 25 60 80 36 52 
49 SERBIA 86 25 43 92 52 28 
50 SINGAPORE 74 20 48 8 72 46 
51 SLOVAKIA 100 52 100 51 77 28 
52 SLOVENIA 71 27 19 88 49 48 
53 SOUTH.AFRICA 49 65 63 49 34 63 
54 SPAIN 57 51 42 86 48 44 
55 SWEDEN 31 71 5 29 53 78 
56 SWITZERLAND 34 68 70 58 74 78 
57 TAIWAN 58 17 45 69 93 49 
58 THAILAND 64 20 34 64 32 45 
59 TURKEY 66 37 45 85 49 49 
60 UK 35 89 66 35 51 69 
61 VENEZUELA 81 12 73 76 16 100 
 
Table 11 Non-Victim Countries National Cultural Values (retrieved from Hofstede Center.) 
No. Country PDI IvC MvF UAI LvS IvR 
1 BURKINA.FASO 70 15 50 55 27 18 
2 CAPE.VERDE 75 20 15 40 12 83 
3 ECUADOR 78 8 63 67 NA NA 
4 EL. SALVADOR 66 19 40 94 20 89 
5 ETHIOPIA 70 20 65 55 NA NA 
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6 GHANA 80 15 40 65 4 72 
7 GUATEMALA 95 6 37 99 NA NA 
8 HONDURAS 80 20 40 50 NA NA 
9 IRAQ 95 30 70 85 25 17 
10 JORDAN 70 30 45 65 16 43 
11 KUWAIT 90 25 40 80 NA NA 
12 LEBONAN 75 40 65 50 14 25 
13 LIBYA 80 38 52 68 23 34 
14 MALAWI 70 30 40 50 NA NA 
15 MOZAMBIQUE 85 15 38 44 11 80 
16 NAMIBIA 65 30 40 45 35 NA 
17 PAKISTAN 55 14 50 70 50 0 
18 PANAMA 95 11 44 86 NA NA 
19 PERU 64 16 42 87 25 46 
20 SENEGAL 70 25 45 55 24 NA 
21 SYRIA 80 35 52 60 30 NA 
22 TANZANIA 70 25 40 50 34 38 
23 UAE 90 25 50 80 NA NA 





Figure 5 National Culture Value Comparison Between USA & Saudi Arabia (Retrieved from Hofstede Center.) 
The next table shows the MWW test results between the social engineering victim and 
non-victim countries. Tests for statistically significant differences at the 5% (0.05) value 
or less are considered successful for statistically showing the existence of a difference. 
Test results that are between 5% and 10% are of interest but are not considered for the 
success criteria. The 5% to 10% values are determined to be of interest because human 
behavior is being measured and it has been observed that there could be an increase in the 
type II error when testing human behavior to 5% p-values. Type II error occurs when the 
researchers do not succeed in rejecting a null hypothesis which is actually false. The PDI, 
IvC, and LvS dimensions consistently showed significant differences between the victim 
and non-victim countries. 
Table 12 MWW Comparison Between Victim & Non-Victim Countries 
Year PDI IvC MvF UAI LvS IvR 
2014 0.001975 0.00000749 0.2311 0.926 0.0001158 0.7741 
 
The findings from the Wilcoxon test indicate significant correlation between the cultural 
dimensions and the victim countries which achieves the rejection of the null hypothesis. 
The results from the tests were, in some samples, unsurprising based on previous studies 
(Sample, 2015), (Karamanian et al., 2016), and (Sample & John, 2016). The IvC results 
state the effects of the group (Hofstede et al., 2010), (Bornstein, Kugler & Zieglemeyer, 
2002). The cultural values seemed to display consistency in this dimension over long 
periods. As the victims' group developed over time, the comparison to the non-victims 


































Hofstede population, yet the drawing toward individualist societies being victims and 
collectivist societies being non-victims persisted to be consistent. As a result, the 
individual yearly findings are very relevant. 
The consistent findings in the PDI dimension are not only notable but also interesting 
given the fact that Hofstede et al. (2010) stated the relationship between authoritarian 
values that define high PDI societies and collectivism. 
The LvS findings of long-term orientation suggest a possible motive to stay involved 
with the attacker or the impersonated character by the attacker. When coupled with low 
PDI and individualism characteristics, this may show a desire to discover more about the 
attacking side. The short-term orientation linked with non-victims implies that this group 
may carry the believe that the attackers will repeat attacking the organization in the 
future. 
These findings indicate the relationship between culture and cyber behavior which shed 
the light on the importance of analyzing that relationship for an improved security 
awareness of organizations. Empirically, we need further studies to evaluate and measure 
the values of organizational culture and occupational personality traits in order to fully 
calculate the influence on external humanistic factors on the susceptibility of employees 
to SE attacks. The demand for more cultural examination of cyber behaviors is crucial. 
The consequences are vital in terms of training and awareness for SE potential victims. 
Based on the same analytical tests, we can measure the significance of the other layers by 
collecting the values of these layers through empirical research. For example, let us 
assume that one dimension of the organizational factors was measured empirically for a 
number of organizations–for example, customer orientation. In this case, the 
organizations would be divided into two groups based on SE attacks–victims and non-
victims. We will have numerical values of the customer orientation dimension, and two 
groups that we can name: sample 1 and sample 2. To measure the significance of this 
dimension on the susceptibility to SE attacks, the steps below are going to be used: 
1. For each value in a sample of n items, obtain a difference score Di between the 
two groups. 
2. Then, ignore positive or negative signs and create a set of n absolute differences 
|Di|. 
3. Eliminate difference scores of zero, providing you a set of n non-zero absolute 
difference scores, where n' ≤ n. Therefore, n' becomes the sample size. 
4. Now, assign ranks Ri from 1 to n to each of the |Di| in a way that the smallest 
absolute difference score gets rank 1 and the largest gets rank n. If two or more 
|Di| are equal, they get assigned the average rank of the ranks they would have 
been assigned individually had ties did not occur. 
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5. Reassign the symbols “+” or “–” to each of the n ranks Ri, based on whether Di 
was previously positive or negative. 
6. Subsequently, the Wilcoxon test statistic W is generated as the sum of the positive 
ranks. 
7. We use the Wilcoxon value to calculate the probability denoted as the p-value for 
the reason of measuring the significance of the analyzed factor. 
At the end, we would have a full statistical analysis of the factors influencing SE 
susceptibility, and their significance within the context of social engineering. 
Chapter 3: Applying the Framework 
3.1 Proposed Framework to Measure Susceptibility to SE Attacks 
To practically use the findings of our suggested framework of the cultural impact, it is 
essential to provide a mechanism by which we can utilize the finding when measuring SE 
susceptibility of workers in the real life. For that reason, we are proposing a framework 
that security practitioners can use to engage the findings of the cultural impact when 
developing awareness and training programs for corporations. Our proposed framework 
is derived from Kevin Mitnick’s attack cycle (Mitnick, & Simon, 2003) and its detailed 
structure is shown in Figure 5. This framework would computationally find weaknesses 
and susceptibility of employees in an organization and would create a personalized 
training and education program to raise employee’s awareness against cybersecurity 
threats. Below we describe how each component of the framework works. 
Figure 6 Components of the Proposed Framework 
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A. Goals and Target 
As shown in Figure 6, in the first phase, the framework identifies the goals and the 
targets. All the employees of a national or international organization would be considered 
the target. And the main goal is to create a personalized training and education program 
based on the susceptibility of the employees to dummy SE threats. 
B. Gathering Employee Information 
In this step, information about the employees is gathered to support attack vectors. This 
step is very crucial for preparation, launching, and testing attacks. All possible sources 
from which the information can be obtained including company websites, social 
networking sites, phone calls, personal blogs/forums will be first identified. Next, tools 
such as Whois, nslookup, and keyhole would be used to gather all pieces of information 
(Wikipedia contributors., 2021), (Wikipedia contributors., 2021), and (Keyhole, 2021). 
All collected information would then be reviewed to gain intelligence into employee 
vulnerabilities. Note, the quality and quantity of information gathered about the target 
will determine the probability to obtain relevant results. If not much information is 
identified, then the scanning process will restart as shown in Figure 6. The fact that all it 
takes is “one employee user” to inadvertently open the gateway to social engineering 
attackers in the corporate sector necessitates this step. However, in order to protect the 
privacy of the employees, each employee information will be associated with a dummy 
name, and any data that identifies the identity of the employee will be removed or 
modified. If necessary, the collected information will be encrypted to preserve the 
privacy of the employees. Full measures will be taken to keep the employee data 
confidential and will not be misused in anyway. The key goal is to educate and train 
vulnerable users through customized training and education in order to protect the 
security of the individuals as well as the organization where he/she works and thus avoid 
the dangerous consequences of SE attacks. 
C. Attack Preparation 
All the collected bits and pieces of information about the employees are combined and 
used for framing all the common SE-attacks against which the users will be tested for 
susceptibility. Typically, a malicious actor commonly uses the following attack vectors to 
compromise the security of individual and organizations: phishing, vishing, credential 
harvester, impersonation, SMishing. In order to attack, dummy versions of these attack 
vectors will be generated using the Social-Engineering Toolkit (SET) (Kennedy, 2020). 
SET is an open-source penetration testing framework that allows the user to generate a 
believable attack quickly and test if the target lures into the target action. Let’s say we are 
using this framework for a US-based company name “ABZ” which has two employees 
with alias names “Bob” and “Alice”. The following example in Table 13, shows the 
national culture factors, organization culture factor along with the scores for each factor 
and employee information gathered in above step C. We use the scores for the national 
cultural factors using the Hofstede model, however since there is no study that measures 
the organization cultural scores the score is marked to be determined (TBD). Measuring 
organizational factor scores in outside the scope of this thesis and hence we will be 
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continuing this research in the future as we plan to conduct empirical study to determine 
these scores for certain companies within US and outside US. However, to show the 
crude design, here we show a toy example how the dummy attack would be launched 
based on randomly choose High and Low scores for customer orientation, level of 
control, focus and approachability factors as shown in Table 13. 


















(Score: TBD)  
Bob 
Recently went for vacation 
to Hawaii; tweeted about 
confrontation with the 
manager; has two pet dogs; 







Level of control 
(Score: Low) 
Alice 
Recent hire (~ 10 months of 
employment with “ABZ”, 
maintains a blog about faith 
and God; etc. 
Uncertainty 
Avoidance 














Example attack 1: Individualism (High)--> Level of control (Low)-->Bob twitted about 
the confrontation with manager in social media --> launch a credential harvester attack (a 
fake email from the manager to Bob that he was fired with a sign-in link to see the details 
of the company policy to fire the employees).  
Example attack 2: Individualism (High)--> Approachability (High)-->Alice maintains a 
blog about belief and God --> launch a phishing attack (a fake email from a church she 
regularly visits asking for donation by clicking a link).  
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As can be seen from above two dummy examples, attack vectors would include all the 
elements of SE attacks including organizational and national cultural factors. This is the 
attack plan which would enable the generation of a susceptibility matrix based on how 
the individuals respond to these dummy attacks. 
D. Testing & Evaluation 
In this step, a simulated/dummy attack created using SET toolkit is launched to lure the 
target into action. An effective pretext will withstand scrutiny and yet expose the 
vulnerabilities of the target. These dummy social engineering attacks will use 
manipulation tactics such as launching an email with long text followed by a hyperlink to 
click. This text would be crafted based on the information gathered in step B which 
evokes the target into remembering a bad or sad incident and subsequently feeling sad. 
Once the target is in the desired emotional state, there is a high probability that the target 
will click the malicious link that would create security holes in his system and turn the 
entire organization at risk. Another attack vector could exploit the faith of the employee. 
For example, sending targets emails purportedly from a legitimate church or mosque 
website urging them to visit the website, where they are requested to make small 
donations for the renovation of the building or something else of similar nature. The 
target would then give away the confidential information to the social engineer. Based on 
whether the target became victim or not the susceptibility matrix to attack vectors is 
generated.  
E. Training & Education 
Once the susceptibility is measured, customized security awareness training and 
education that would guide employees to take corrective measures to stop or reduce the 
impact of an SE attack will be recommended. This process would not stop once the goal 
of training and education is achieved rather this process would repeat itself periodically 
using new attack vector scenarios thereby creating strong human firewalls. 
Chapter 4: Conclusion & Future Work 
4.1 Conclusion 
In this thesis, we discussed the impact of organizational cultural factors and personality 
traits on the susceptibility of employees to SE attacks. We demonstrate the relationship 
between those factors and the social engineering psychological triggers. Furthermore, we 
have shown how to use the assumed relationship in a given organization using a proposed 
framework that would detect the susceptibility and create an awareness program tailored 
for the employees’ specific needs. We hope that the research initiated in this thesis will 
motivate other researchers to develop a more comprehensive understanding and 
measuring scores for organizational culture, personality traits factors and how each 
influence the other in better understanding social engineering attacks, and eventually 
design countermeasures and security awareness programs that are more effective in 
preventing SE attacks. During our research, we found out the scarcity of existing 
literature on the influence of such factors within the context of social engineering which 
35 
 
pose a challenge for corporates today to mitigate the damage of SE attacks. We 
conducted an analysis on the effect of national culture based on statistical tests. Such 
analysis could not be done for organizational culture influences since the scores for 
organizational culture is unfortunately not available in literature. Thus, in this thesis we 
cannot validate the working of our framework and hence we aim to do that in our future 
research by first conducting empirical studies measuring the scores for organizational 
culture factors. 
 
4.2 Future Research Direction 
The proposed framework in this thesis is theoretical and is still at the in the infancy stage 
of development. Extensive multi-year research is required to make this proposed 
framework fully functional and automatic before it can be adopted and benefit a security 
practitioner.  
 In this thesis, a deep analysis could not be conducted due to unavailability of scores for 
various factors for different layers. So, the first part of our future research will involve 
conducting empirical experiments to collect data from various companies within US and 
outside US. We anticipate that this will be a many years project and require collaboration 
with companies and other research collaborators. We will first start with small pool of 
companies within US and slowly expand it to companies outside US. After the scores are 
determined, we will conduct more empirical experiments to validate mapped relations 
between the factors and the psychological triggers. At first, in a simulated organizational 
setup, real human subjects will be invited to participate for crude analysis and automation 
of the framework. After which our goal is to conduct real experiments in a real 
organization by initiating research collaboration with the companies. The impact of 
organizational and national culture will be measured through questionnaires based on 
existing models of Hofstede Cultural Dimensions and Multi-Focus Model on 
Organizational Culture. The occupational traits of employees will be measured using the 
Business-focused Inventory of Personality (BIP). Based on these models, a metric will be 
designed to evaluate the performance of the subjects. Then, the result will be analyzed to 
compute the weight and scores of employees. 
These computed scores would be used during the designing of our simulated SE attack in 
order to give focus to the techniques and methods that increase the susceptibility of the 
employees. The components of the framework will be set according to the computed 
scores. As a result, we could analyze the outcome of the attack and evaluate the findings 
based on our calculated weight metrics. The computed values should give us an accurate 
evaluation of workers' susceptibility to SE attacks within the organization. Hence, 
mitigation strategies can be adjusted according to a specific group of workers. Knowing 
which factors modify the susceptibility to SE attacks will allows us to detect or even 
predict which kinds of attacks will be more likely to succeed in a specific personnel 
group which will aid in effective countermeasure steps such as team building, high-level 
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personalized awareness training, or rapid cultural transformation towards a security-
aware organizational culture. 
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